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ABSTRACT 
Network attack classification is essential to intrusion detection in that it could improve the performance of intrusion detection 
system. Several machine-learning methods have been applied to correlating attacks. However, the attack classification 
models developed in these methods share one common limitation in that they strongly rely on the training data, which can 
hardly be generalized to other datasets.  To address the limitation, we propose to utilize domain knowledge in form of 
taxonomy and ontology to improve attack correlation in cyber security application. In addition, the attack correlations 
generated by machine-learning techniques are expected to refine the original attack taxonomy. We evaluate the proposed 
methods via a series of experiments. The findings of this study suggest that domain knowledge and machine-learning 
technique should be mutually beneficial and complementary to each other for attack classification.  
Keywords 
Taxonomy, Ontology, Cyber Security, Attack Correlation, Machine Learning. 
INTRODUCTION 
With the rapid growth of network applications nowadays, intrusion detection systems (IDS) have been widely deployed for 
monitoring network systems for malicious activities.  In order to improve the detection rate of IDS, attack classification 
becomes an important task in intrusion detection.  Several machine learning methods have been proposed and applied in 
correlating attacks [1]; however, these approaches are limited in that their results strongly rely on the training data. In 
addition, these methods alone do not perform well in intrusion detection because of their lack of knowledge from the cyber 
security domain [2, 3]. To address the limitation, we propose to utilize domain knowledge in form of Taxonomy and 
Ontology to improve attack correlation in cyber security.  In addition, we integrate domain knowledge with machine-learning 
technique in attack classification. 
In the rest of this paper, we start with a survey of existing taxonomies and ontologies in the cyber security domain, and 
illustrate their benefits for intrusion detection.  Then, we discuss how we apply attack taxonomy to adjust attack correlations 
from semantic networks that are constructed based on the results of machine learning.  Next, we demonstrate through an 
experiment that the attack correlations generated by machine learning techniques can be used to verify and refine the original 
attack taxonomy.  Finally, we conclude the paper with findings and suggestions on attack classification. 
RELATED WORK 
In this section, we surveyed existing taxonomy and ontology in the cyber security domain and discuss their role and 
application in intrusion detection. 
 
Taxonomies in Cyber Security Domain 
A taxonomy is a classification system where the classification scheme conforms to a systematic arrangement into groups or 
categories according to established criteria.  [4] According to Simpson [5], he defines a taxonomic character as a feature, 
attribute or characteristic that is divisible into at least two contrasting states and used for constructing classifications.  
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Taxonomies only provide schema for classification.  They lack the necessary and sufficient constructs needed to enable a 
software system to reason over an instance of the taxonomy, which is representative of the domain under observation [6]. 
Several attack taxonomies have been proposed for the area of intrusion detection, which are summarized in table 1.Each of 
the taxonomies is discussed in detail next. 
 
Taxonomy Focused Aspects Relations to other work 
Bishop’s 
vulnerability 
taxonomy  
Vulnerabilities rather than attacks. Earlier attack taxonomy 
Howard’s taxonomy Processes. Modification of Bishop’s 
Lough’s taxonomy The characteristics of attacks. 
Categories are mutually exclusive. 
Refined Howard’s to meet 
the “mutual exclusion” 
requirement. 
Simon and Ray’s 
taxonomy 
A comprehensive scheme that contains 
four dimensions 
References to Bishop’s, 
Howard’s and Lough’s.  
MIT Lincoln Lab’s 
taxonomy 
Attack consequence or goals Inheritance from Simon and 
Ray’s classification.  
 
Table 1. A list of attack taxonomies and their contributions 
Bishop’s Vulnerability Taxonomy 
In [7], Bishop presents a taxonomy of UNIX vulnerabilities in which the underlying vulnerabilities are used to create a 
classification scheme.  He suggests that one of the main benefits of a taxonomy is that it should assist in the decision on 
resource investment.  While this taxonomy focuses on vulnerabilities rather than attacks, as one of the most important early 
taxonomies in the cyber security field, it still provides a good background for proposing new taxonomies. 
Howard’s Taxonomy 
Howard’s approach in creating taxonomy of computer and network attack [8] is broad and process-based, which consists of 
five stages: attacks, tools, access, results and objectives.  This taxonomy takes a process-driven rather than a classification 
perspective. However, Lough [9] points out that Howard fails to meet one of his taxonomy requirements – mutual exclusion, 
that taxonomy will categorize each attack into at most one category.  
Lough’s Taxonomy 
In [9], Lough proposed a taxonomy based upon the characteristics of attacks, instead of using a tree-like taxonomy.  The 
proposed four characteristics of attacks are the following: improper validation, improper exposure, improper randomness 
and improper deallocation.  Simon [10] criticizes that Lough’s taxonomy is general and does not discuss about attacks in 
terms of worms, viruses and Trojans, which is how attacks are usually described in practice, so it may not be useful for the 
day-to-day task of identifying and classifying new attacks.  
Simon and Ray’s Taxonomy 
Simon [10] provides a common classification scheme that can be shared between organizations.  Two general models for a 
taxonomy design are also discussed in their paper: tree-like structure or list based.  The design of a tree-like structure will 
have more general categories at the top and specific categories at the leaves.  However, how to deal with blended attacks in 
one tree-like structure is a problem; also, for attacks, they do not often have many common traits, thus it makes the creation 
of broad categories even harder.  Another way to create taxonomy is by using lists.  A flat-list with general categories can be 
considered or a flat-list with very specific categories can be proposed.  Again, in order to deal with blended attacks, the 
categories may be too general, and consequently of limited use; or the categories are created so specific that the list will 
become too long with few instances within each category. 
The taxonomy proposed in paper [10] took a different approach from either of the tree-like or flat-list taxonomies, despite 
that both of these approaches are used as components in their taxonomy. They proposed four major dimensions for attack 
classification.  The first, which is also the base dimension, is used to categorize the attack into an attack class based on the 
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attack vector.  The attack vector of an attack is the main means by which the attack reaches its target.  The second dimension 
covers the targets of the attack, while the third dimension categorizes what is being used to attack the target; in other words, 
the third dimension covers the vulnerabilities and exploits that the attack uses, refers to a Common Vulnerabilities and 
Exposures (CVE) entry [11].  The last four dimension deals with attacks having payloads or effect beyond themselves.  In 
addition, other dimensions are also proposed especially in regards to how to react to a new attack that falls into a certain 
category.  For example, these added dimensions are: Damage, which attempts to measure the amount of damage that attack 
does; Cost, which for the money by cleaning up after an attack; Propagation, which applies more to replicating attacks; 
Defense, the methods by which an attack has been defended against could be made into a further defense dimension.  
Table 2 below shows the results of classifying some attacks using Simon and Ray’s four-dimensional taxonomy.  
 
Attack 1
st
 Dimension 2
nd
 Dimension 3
rd
 Dimension 4
th
 Dimension 
Blaster Network-aware 
worm 
MS Windows NT 
4.0, 2000, XP, 
Server 2003 
CAN-2003-0352 
(CVE entry [10]) 
TCP packet 
flooding DoS 
Use of John 
the Ripper 
Guessing password 
attack 
Unix family, 
Windows NT, 2000 
& XP 
Configuration 
(general type of 
vulnerabilities) 
Disclosure of 
information 
Sobig.F Mass-mailing 
worm 
Email client Configuration 
(general type of 
vulnerabilities) 
Trojan 
Morris 
worm 
Network-aware 
worm 
BSD 4 Sun 3 & 
VAX variants 
Implementation & 
Design (general 
type of 
vulnerabilities) 
Theft of service 
& 
subversion 
 
Table 2. Classification sample results 
Simon and Ray [10] also use a case study to illustrate the classification process of the attack “Morris Worm”, which is a 
blended attack consisted of a number of components including the Sendmail attack, the Fingerd attack and the Rsh/Rexec 
attack.  In its first dimension, since the worm uses these three components to spread and uses network services to spread, 
therefore, the blended attack category is network-aware worm.  In the second dimension, the worm attackes Sun 
Microsystems Sun 3 and VAX computers running BSD 4 variants, and the three above-mentioned components use the 
vulnerabilities to attack VAX and Sun 3 BSD variants.  Given that the worm uses a number of vulnerabilities to spread, the 
broader categories are identified in the third dimension - Implementation & Design.  Finally, the fourth dimension consists of 
two entries: theft of service (as the worm stole both network and computer resources) and subversion (as infected systems 
were used to propagate the worm). 
Several benefits of using proposed taxonomy are discussed in the paper.  The taxonomy provides a holistic approach to 
classifying attacks, which provides a useful and consistent taxonomy across different organizations.  Moreover, the issues of 
how the blended attacks should be analyzed and described have been solved in a promising way.  Authors also suggest 
utilizing their proposed taxonomy on the research of correlating attacks that previously may have appeared to have nothing in 
common but they can be related through one of these dimensions.  They pointed out in the further work to move their 
taxonomy towards a knowledge base, which could detect correlation and assist in the process of classification implemented 
by artificial intelligence (AI). 
MIT Lincoln Lab’s Taxonomy 
Weber et al. [12, 13, and 14] provided a taxonomy that defines the category by attack consequence or goals, during the 1998 
and 1999 DARPA off line intrusion detection system evaluation.  They include the sub-categories of Denial of Service, 
Remote to Local, User to Root and Probe. Example of the consequence categories are shown in table 3, which will be 
referred, in our research. 
 
He et al.           Using Domain Knowledge to Facilitate Cyber Security Analysis 
Proceedings of the Eighteenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Seattle, Washington, August 9-12, 2012. 4 
Attack Category Attack Name 
Denial of Service(DoS) smurf, neptune, back, teardrop, pod, land 
Remote to Local(R2L) warezclient, guess_passwd, warezmaster, imap, 
ftp_write, multihop, phf, spy 
User to Root(U2R) buffer_overflow, rootkit, loadmodule, perl 
Probe satan, ipsweep, portsweep, nmap 
 
      Table 3. A taxonomy that defines the attack category by consequence 
Each attack category is described as the following: 
(1) Denial of Service (DoS): It is designed to disrupt a host or network service, and the attacker make some computing or 
memory resource too busy to handle legitimate requests, or denies legitimate users access to a machine.   
(2) Remote to Local (R2L): It occurs when an attacker who has the ability to send packets to a machine over a network, but 
who does not have an account on that machine—exploits some vulnerability to gain local access as a user of that machine. 
(3) User to Root (U2R): It happens when a local user on a machine is able to obtain privileges to gain root access to the 
system. 
(4) Probe: also named as “scan attacks”, these include many programs that can automatically scan a network of computers to 
gather information or find known vulnerabilities.  They can provide a map of machines and services and pinpoint weak points 
in a network, and thus, are more dangerous. 
Undercoffer et al. [5] have incorporated these classifications into their work.  By referring to their IDS ontology, the class 
attack has the property of “resulting in” and this construction is predicated upon the notion that an attack results in some 
consequence.  The class Consequence is comprised of several subclasses that include Denial of Service, Remote to Local, 
User to Root and Probe, that are shown in figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Part of IDS Ontology in paper [5] 
Goals of a taxonomy have been discussed in several research papers. Weber [15] summarizes the desirable features for a 
general taxonomy of computer intrusions as the following: it can be used to guide evaluation of security tools, particularly 
IDSs; it can help prevent attacks in the future; it can be used to explain the cause of an attack.  The criteria on how to evaluate 
a taxonomy is also discussed in them  thesis.  
Ontologies In Cyber Security Domain 
Ontology, unlike taxonomies, provides more constructs that include machine interpretable definitions of the concepts within 
a specific domain and the relations between them.  Gruber [16] defines an ontology as an explicit specification of a 
conceptualization.  The term, which is borrowed from philosophy, is used to provide a formal specification of the concepts 
    Attack 
Consequence 
     Denial of 
Service 
     Remote 
to Local 
    User to 
Root 
     Probe 
Resulting in 
Sub Class Of 
Sub Class Of 
Sub Class Of 
Sub Class Of 
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and relationships that can exist between entities within a domain.  Accordingly, ontologies are designed for enabling 
knowledge sharing and reuse between the entities within a domain. 
According to Staab and Maedche [17], taxonomies differ from ontologies in that the former does not contain the necessary 
meta-knowledge required to convey modeling primitives such as concepts, relations and axioms that are required to make 
sense of and operate on specific objects. 
There are several ways to build an ontology for a specific domain [18]. For instance, we can build a related ontology based 
on one taxonomy available in that domain.  Moreover, a complete and well-formed ontology should include a taxonomy.  On 
the other hand, we can reuse old ontology, and rebuild them based on up-to-date domain knowledge. 
Compared with taxonomies, there are much less published research in creating ontologies in the intrusion detection area. The 
following are only two that can be found from the literature. 
Target-Centric Computer Attack Ontology 
The very first research by using semantic web methodology in intrusion detection area was done by Jeffrey Undercoffer et al. 
[5].  They suggested transitioning from taxonomies to ontologies in order to mitigate the effects of some problems caused by 
taxonomies, and they created an ontology specifying a model of computer attacks. To construct their ontology, they 
conducted an empirical analysis [19] of the features and attributes of over 4,000 classes of computer attacks and intrusions.  
They also analyzed their corresponding attack strategies and how they are categorized according to system component 
targeted means of attacks, consequence of attacks and location of attackers.  The authors argued that any taxonomic 
characteristics used to define a computer attack are limited in scope to the features that are observable and measurable at the 
target of the attack, and they presented their model as a target-centric ontology. 
They also illustrated the benefits of utilizing an ontology with use case scenarios.  One of the scenarios is how to use pre-
defined ontology to predict specific attack.  DAML + OIL notation has been used to create instances of their ontology, and 
the representation of an instance of a neptune attack is illustrated in Figure 2 below.  The first statement indicates that an 
event identified as 00035 has occurred and it has the resulting _in property, which is an instance of neptune identified with 
event number 00038. 
 
 
Figure 2. DAML+ OIL Notation for An Instance Of A Nepture Attack 
 
When the ontology was queried for one of instances of Denial of Service (DoS) category attacks, the following statements are 
returned by the system shown in figure 3: 
 
 
          Figure 3. Ontology querying results by the request of DoS  
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The authors pointed out in this use case that they only queried for the existence of a Denial of Service attack, but did not 
specifically ask for the type of nepture attack.  However, the instance of the nepture attack was returned because it is a 
subclass of Denial of Service (DoS), which has been pre-defined in the ontology.   
Attack Ontology in Distributed Intrusion Detection System 
Another paper [20] also discussed about utilizing methods and techniques of semantic web in the Intrusion Detection 
Systems. They recognize that many of Intrusion Detection systems depend only on one kind of sources: network data or host 
data, and they do not have sufficient audit data, and thus they could cause high false positive and false negative.  Their focus 
is on applying ontology in distributed intrusion detection environments and how to design these distributed systems to 
communicate with other systems.   
In order to adapt to the distributed intrusion detection environments, their design contains different systems, each of which 
can have their own Intrusion Detection System, depends on the requirements, so they can do their detection individually.  In 
addition, there is a central system that contains their proposed attack ontology.  The author proposed to build their ontology 
based on Simon’s taxonomy [10], which has four dimensions discussed in table 1, and the central system can extract the 
semantic relations among computer attacks, intrusions and suspect activities that occur in different systems in the network 
with this ontology.  
There are different types of Intrusion Detection Systems, such as those are based on signatures, anomalies, network 
monitoring, host monitoring, etc.  The key problem for designing one central system is how to correlate different kind of 
information from such distributed systems and report them to the central system.  In their research, they modified a standard 
message format that can be converted into the format which is understandable for central system, for sending message via 
network to communicate between individual systems and central system. 
The benefit of applying such an ontology is that it can solve the single point of failure problem in a network system.  The 
single point of failure is a situation that if an intruder can prevent a central analyzer from working, for example, by crashing 
the host, the whole network would be unprotected.  In their proposed distributed intrusion detection systems, every system 
has its own intrusion detection system.  In other words, every system in the network utilizes two intrusion detection systems: 
the first is of its own and the second one is the ontology-based central detection system. The ontology in central system is 
also updated by other individual detection systems for attack properties from time to time in order to tackle most up-to-date 
attacks in the network.  
 
PROPOSED METHODS 
We propose that the domain knowledge and machine-learning techniques should be used together on attack classification 
task, which is expected to improve the performance of attack classification. The approach consists of two complementary 
components. On the one hand, we apply attack taxonomy in adjusting attack correlations from semantic networks that are 
based on machine learning techniques – similarity coefficients.  On the other hand, we use the attack correlation results 
generated by machine learning techniques to verify and refine the original attack taxonomy. These two approaches are 
described in detail in this section. 
Apply Attack Taxonomy In Adjusting Attack Correlations 
We first proposed to utilize attack taxonomy as domain knowledge to adjust the attack correlation results generated by 
machine learning technique.  In our previous research of applying semantic network in identifying network attacks [21], we 
created semantic networks for cyber security domain - each node represents an attack and the edges can be used to identify 
other relevant attacks according to one adjustable user-defined threshold for “relevance score”.  There were two steps 
involved in creating Semantic Networks: 1) automatically create First-Mode Semantic Network using similarity coefficients, 
such as Anderberg and Jaccard coefficient; and 2) extract domain expertise to fine-tune the previous attack correlation results 
as Second-Mode Semantic Network. In this paper, we mainly focus on how to apply domain knowledge to adjust the first-
mode similarity-based semantic network. 
Our experiment results with dataset such as DARPA intrusion detection evaluation data [22] show that solely applying 
similarity measures with the first-mode semantic network did not result in good classification results; nonetheless, it can 
serve as a good foundation for the further adjustment in correlating attacks.  Moreover, external domain knowledge can be 
incorporated into adjusting similarity-based semantic network. Thus, we proposed the second mode semantic network that 
utilizes a mature attack taxonomy in modifying our first mode of similarity-based semantic network. We proposed that 
additional semantic information described as semantic rules can be extracted from domain knowledge represented as 
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Taxonomy and Ontology. Specifically, in this research, we adopted both the taxonomy from MIT Lincoln Lab and semantic 
rule as defined below: 
Definitions [Semantic Rule] 
Given two attack nodes xp and xq, a semantic rule “s” is defined as: spq is the semantic score associating with these two 
attacks xp, xq based on domain knowledge such as Taxonomy. If xp and xq fall into same category of network attacks 
according to the Taxonomy, we set the value of spq to 1; otherwise, spq is set to 0.  
Then, spq is used to adjust the previous relevance score rspq in reference to a predefined threshold σ by domain experts. If | spq 
- rspq | > σ, then rspq needs to be updated by using semantic rules, and the degree of the adjustment ∆ will also be customized 
by domain experts to reflect the relevance score among attacks in the current network environment. Hence, there are two 
possible ways to update previous relevance score: 
(a) If (spq - rspq) > 0, the updated relevance score RS’pq = rspq + |spq - rspq|× ∆ 
(b) If (spq - rspq) < 0, the updated relevance score RS’pq = rspq  – |spq - rspq|× ∆ 
Next, we illustrate how our second mode semantic network can be used to identify relevant attacks in the current network 
situation. A second mode semantic network is shown in figure 4 and the scores on the edges have been adjusted by semantic 
rules extracted from the attack taxonomy (See table 3): 
 
    
                
 
 
 
  
 
 
     Table 4. A concrete example of Semantic Network  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Example of second mode semantic network 
 
In table 4, for the specific sequence of event (ID = 73727), Bayesian prediction model is first used to identify the attack type 
“Rootkit” as the highest probability of occurrence in the network. We then locate “Rootkit” as the initial node in our second 
mode semantic network, as shown in Figure 4. In addition, our approach will automatically indicate other attack types 
relevant to “Rootkit”, and compute their relevance scores. The second column “Actual attack label” is used to validate the 
results of the semantic network. For instance, the attack “Perl” is predicted by the semantic network with the highest 
relevance score, and it happens to be the correct attack label for sequence ID = 73727. Thus, in this case, after utilizing attack 
taxonomy on the first mode similarity based semantic network, our second mode semantic network accurately detects 
probable attacks. 
 
 
ID 
Actual 
Label 
Bayesian 
Prediction 
Relevant 
Attacks 
Relevance 
Score 
73727 Perl Rootkit Perl 0.903333 
   
warezclient 0.265921 
   
back 0.263353 
   
multihop 0.256667 
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Verify and Adjust Attack Taxonomy Using Attack Correlations 
The attack correlation results by similarity-based semantic network can also be used to validate and refine the original attack 
taxonomy, especially when such general attack taxonomy is applied in specific classification situation.  This point is 
illustrated with a specific scenario in the following. 
In our research, we first captured the attack signatures and created binary feature vectors, and then used four similarity 
measures in generating four different kinds of semantic networks based on these features, including Jaccard similarity 
coefficient, Anderberg similarity coefficient, Simple Matching similarity coefficient and Pearson's correlation coefficient.  In 
order to compare the attack correlation results generated by our similarity-based semantic networks with the one described in 
the attack taxonomy, the same data source - DARPA intrusion detection evaluation dataset [22] was reused, and the attack 
taxonomy was adopted from MIT Lincoln Lab. 
The experiment proceeded in the following steps: We first applied K-means clustering methods on the results of similarity-
based semantic networks, and set K to four since it is expected to have four clusters according to the four categories in attack 
taxonomy from MIT Lincoln Lab. The analyses were performed by using K-means function from the Matlab software.  Next, 
we analyzed these attack types from each of these clusters against the corresponding attack category as described in 
taxonomy, where the mismatched attacks were highlighted in grey and correct attack category labels were also marked.  The 
analysis process has been repeated for four different semantic networks, as discussed above, and our preliminary results are 
reported in tables 5-8: 
  
JC Kmeans (K=4) Predicted Attack Name Actual Attack Category based on the Taxonomy 
1 portsweep Probe 
  satan 
  guess_passwd   
2 teardrop DoS 
  smurf   
  spy   
  pod   
  ipsweep   
3 perl R2L 
  ftp_write + 
  buffer_overflow U2R 
  loadmodule   
  rootkit   
  back   
  multihop   
  warezclient   
  phf   
  warezmaster   
4 neptune DoS 
  imap 
  nmap 
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  land   
 
Table 5. Clustering Results by Jaccard Similarity Based Semantic Network 
                      
AD Kmeans (K=4) Predicted Attack Name Actual Attack Category Based on the Taxonomy 
1 neptune DoS 
  imap   
  nmap   
  land   
2 teardrop DoS 
  smurf   
  spy   
  pod   
  ipsweep   
3 perl R2L  
  ftp_write + 
  buffer_overflow U2R 
  loadmodule   
  rootkit   
  back   
  multihop   
  warezclient   
  phf   
  warezmaster   
4 portsweep Probe 
  satan   
  guess_passwd   
 
Table 6. Clustering Results By Anderberg Similarity Based Semantic Network 
                 
SMC Kmeans 
(K=4) Predicted Attack Name Actual Attack Category based on the Taxonomy 
1 neptune DoS 
  land   
2 portsweep Probe 
  satan   
  guess_passwd   
3 perl R2L 
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  ftp_write + 
  buffer_overflow U2R 
  loadmodule   
  rootkit   
  back   
  multihop   
  warezclient   
  phf   
  warezmaster   
4 teardrop DoS 
  smurf + 
  imap R2L 
  spy + 
  nmap Probe 
  pod   
  ipsweep   
 
Table 7. Clustering Results By Simple Matching Similarity Based Semantic Network 
                                    
Correlation Kmeans 
(K=4) Predicted Attack Name Actual Attack Category based on the Taxonomy 
1 portsweep Probe 
  neptune + 
  land DoS 
  satan   
  guess_passwd   
2 teardrop DoS 
  smurf + 
  imap Probe 
  nmap   
  pod   
  ipsweep   
3 ftp_write R2L 
  buffer_overflow + 
  loadmodule U2R 
  rootkit   
  back   
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  multihop   
  warezclient   
  warezmaster   
4 perl R2L 
  spy   
  phf   
 
Table 8. Clustering Results By Correlation Similarity Based Semantic Network 
 
The experiment results show that the clustering results based on Jaccard and Anderberg similarity metrics are better than 
Simple Matching and Correlation similarity metrics. This is because the former metrics led to more homogeneous clusters in 
reference to the attack taxonomy of MIT Lincoln Lab, as shown in table 3. 
Nonetheless, it is noted from the clustering results of Jaccard and Anderberg metrics, that there is still one combined cluster, 
which is supposed to be split into two separate clusters – R2L and U2R, according to the taxonomy as shown in table 3.  The 
same problem occurs to the other two clustering results.  Therefore, from the machine learning perspective, we speculate that 
the datasets in the categories of Jaccard and Anderberg have similar attack signature values, thus they are inclined to form 
into homogeneous clusters.  However, according to the taxonomy in table 3, R2L and U2R are two separate attack categories.  
Thus, we speculate that only applying attack taxonomy may not be sufficient for such attack correlation task. Instead, 
machine learning and data mining techniques applied to original datasets should also be taken into consideration. That being 
said, after studying the original descriptions of two attack categories - from the taxonomy, we found that R2L and U2R do 
have similar behaviors in terms of gaining some kind of access – for examples, R2L occurs when attackers exploit some 
vulnerability to gain local access; and U2R takes place when attackers obtain privileges to gain root access. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we surveyed existing taxonomies and ontologies in the cyber security domain, and illustrated their roles and 
applications in intrusion detection systems.  In addition, we proposed a method that leverages one of attack taxonomies in 
improving attack correlations in semantic networks that are generated by machine learning techniques.  Further, we 
demonstrate that the attack correlation results of machine learning technique, such as our similarity-based semantic network 
could also be used to verify and refine the original attack taxonomy, especially for specific classification situation.   This 
study shows that attack taxonomy and machine learning techniques are complementary to each other and thus should be used 
together to improve the attack correlation results. 
Only one taxonomy was used in the present study to evaluate the proposed method. In future work, we plan on integrating 
different attack taxonomies and ontologies for attack classification and applying such domain knowledge to other tasks 
involved in intrusion detection. Also, we are interested in doing some investigations to link the vulnerability to a specific user 
behavior, in order to show how the IDS data relates to the human behaviors factors; and we expect that they can also be 
captured in our taxonomies as domain knowledge to further assist attack correlation tasks. 
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